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Introduction
François Hollande’s victory in the 2012 presidential elections marked a return to the
Elysée Palace for the Socialist Party for the first time since 1995, and a second cycle
of alternation away from a right-wing President. Hollande is only the second left-wing
President under the Fifth Republic, following François Mitterrand. For the three previous
presidential races – 1995, 2002 and 2007 – many Socialists felt that victory had been
achievable, not least in 2002 when their candidate Lionel Jospin then failed to progress
even to the second round due to an unfortunate combination of low turnout and a high
number of candidates. In 2012, the left were fighting to escape the label of executive also-
rans who had once again lost an election, rather than their right-wing opponents winning it. 
A Hollande victory therefore struck his party and its supporters as overdue. Add to this
the stalling in 2007 of the regular alternation between left and right majorities in the
National Assembly which had occurred between 1981 and 2002 – a nevertheless unstable
situation which could be characterised as hyper-alternance borne of mass political dissat-
isfaction (Evans and Ivaldi, 2002) – and anything other than a Socialist victory appeared
unjust. With a Senate majority for the very first time, and a crushing landslide in the
regional elections two years previously, all the indications were that, by June 2012, both
the Elysée and the Palais Bourbon would be Socialist-controlled.
Yet the experience, not so much of 2007 and Ségolène Royal’s defeat in the second
round, but of 2002 and Lionel Jospin’s momentous defeat in the first round of the election,
led rational expectations of Hollande’s victory to be tempered by irrational concerns over
the power of French elections to generate ‘a surprise’. A renascent extreme right, in the
shape of Marine Le Pen; a centrist candidate, François Bayrou, who had run Sarkozy and
Royal a close third in 2007, and who could potentially attract centre-left voters with a
programme based on social liberalism and an economic Realpolitik; and the spectre of a
disinterested, or worse, disenfranchised electorate turning out in only paltry numbers:
despite all the evidence to the contrary, the suspicion of the left once more losing ground
to the conservative right dogged Hollande until the eventual announcement of the winner
on the evening of 6 May.
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The sound foundations of a Socialist victory
In retrospect, these fears were unfounded. Marine Le Pen’s challenge came only to the
moderate right, at least in net effect. Despite the significant proportion of blue-collar voters
she managed to attract, this represented a return to the FN electorate of the mid-1990s, an
ever-smaller group in the electorate as a whole, and one no longer crucial to the Socialist’s
success, practically if not ideologically. Conversely, the support that her father Jean-Marie
had lost to the conservative and authoritarian Sarkozy in 2007 returned disappointed in
large part to the Front national fold, depriving the incumbent of a still-crucial tranche of
voters. François Bayrou failed to match his personal best of 2007, unable to present a
sufficiently persuasive alternative to what was on offer to his left, and indeed in economic
terms, to his right. His apparent ouverture to Hollande, and his indication that he himself
would vote for the Socialist in the second round, alienated many centre-right voters, and
rendered his appeal to the centre-left redundant. Lastly, voters turned out in large numbers
– not quite to the level of 2007, but above 80 per cent nonetheless. Electoral mathematics
did not catch up with the Socialists. 
Structurally, competition amongst the presidential candidates presented a number of
advantages to Hollande. Firstly, the number of candidates in the race was smaller than in
2002, and even than in 2007 (Table 1).
Table 1: Candidate competition in French presidential elections (1995-2012)
Note: the effective number of candidates or parties is formally defined as the inverse of the sum
of squared individual candidate/party proportions of the vote (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).
The worry of a left vote spread too thinly across too many candidates was unfounded.
Looking across the left candidates, the number dropped from seven in 2007 (if José Bové
is counted as of the left) to five. Of course, the absolute number of candidates does not
tell us the eventual spread of vote. But, as the second row of Table 1 shows, the effective
number of candidates – that is, the number of candidates weighted as a proportion of their
vote (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) – was indeed much lower than 2002 and almost
identical to 2007. The lessons of polarised fragmentation learnt in 2007 were remembered
five years later in a return to essentially moderate bi-polar, if still ideologically distinct,
pluralism. 
In the lead-up to the final campaign period, initiated by the lodging of candidatures,
the left bloc proved far more stable than the right. Only one withdrawal – that of Jean-
Pierre Chevènement – represented a change in the gallery of candidates to the left of
centre. On the right, conversely, a large number of candidates withdrew either in support of
Sarkozy as a gesture to right solidarity, or because of an inability to collect the famous 500
signatures of elected representatives: Jean-Pierre Borloo, Hervé Morin, Dominique de
Villepin, Christine Boutin, inter alia. Whilst the right painted this as mobilisation behind a
1995 2002 2007 2012
Number of candidates 9 16 12 10
Effective number of
candidates
5.97 8.75 4.70 4.77
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common mainstream right candidate, which was undoubtedly an accurate description of
the political motivation, the competitive effect was of unstable supply regrouping on the
right, exacerbated by the strong presence of a Marine Le Pen able to garner sufficient
signatures, contrasting with a stable choice-set on the left. From François Hollande’s
investiture as Socialist candidate on 22 October 2011, no visible challenger on the left
emerged at any point during the race. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the second most successful
candidate of the left, did represent an overwhelming challenge to the other radical left
candidates, leaving less than 2 per cent of the first round vote between them, but pushed
the Socialist candidate at most to sharpen a leftist economic agenda on pension reform
and welfare support. Mélenchon’s own target, not just for the presidentials, but also in his
choice of her Pas-de-Calais constituency for the subsequent legislative election, was
Marine Le Pen. 
His ability to rally support around a ‘positive’ radical agenda, in stark relief to Le Pen’s
more exclusionary vision, may have fallen short of expectations, with a 6 per cent deficit
on the Front national candidate. Key to Hollande’s success, however, was that this support
from the former Socialist Senator moved to him in the second round – a dynamic not
mirrored on the right from Le Pen to Sarkozy, or indeed Bayrou to Sarkozy. In their second
round survey, Ipsos estimated that 80 per cent of Mélenchon voters moved to Hollande;
only 50 per cent of Le Pen’s and 40 per cent of Bayrou’s were similarly obliging to Sarkozy
(Ipsos, ‘2nd tour présidentielle 2012. Comprendre le vote des Français’, 3-5 May 2012).
This stability reflects the steady-state of the Socialist candidacy itself. As Clift noted in
the year prior to the election, the Socialist Party threatened to derail its own challenge to
the incumbent through a number of problems, including a nationally solipsistic economic
programme rooted in a certain reading of the French Republican tradition, as well as an
organisational structure and candidate selection process which hinder as much as help
any eventual Socialist contender (Clift, 2011, 22). In fact, the party demonstrated a unity
behind Hollande and exploited precisely the Socialist programmatic specificity to ensure
victory. Since the setting out of the Socialist Party’s programme and Hollande’s own set of
60 engagements pour la France, the key tenets of his eventual programme of government
remained constant – in contrast to the frenetic ‘policy-a-day’ activity of Sarkozy in the last
days of the campaign. At the time, Sarkozy and the UMP’s rapid-response propaganda
machine through traditional media and new social media such as Twitter appeared more
advanced and politically attuned than the Socialists’ mantra-like insistence on their
programme’s contents. In retrospect, their dogmatic approach demonstrated confidence.
Hollande’s prosaic consistency was an advantage.
Socialist unity was undoubtedly spurred on partly by the unexpected fall from grace of
Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Whilst Strauss-Kahn’s candidacy was never assured, the relative
certainty of his victory, were he to stand in the Socialist primaries, had been confirmed by
opinion polls and commentators alike. His disappearance shortly before the primaries
began could have been disastrous for the Socialists. However, his relative distance from
the party in his role as Director of the International Monetary Fund in New York; the
distance carefully maintained by the party and its éléphants from their erstwhile leader-in-
waiting subsequent to his being charged over the Sofitel affair; and a consequent
engagement with the primary process as though DSK had never existed, allowed the party
to regroup around the eventual winner.
Throughout the end of 2011 and early months of 2012, the Socialist Party showed a
cohesion and programmatic coherence behind Hollande uncommon to French political
parties of any hue. The defeated primary candidates fell in line behind him, Martine Aubry
continuing as General Secretary and Manuel Valls playing an integral part in the campaign
team for Hollande. Arnaud Montebourg, the most likely loose cannon of the group, came
closest to upsetting party stability in accusing his colleagues in the Pas-de-Calais area of
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corrupt practice, in the process incurring the ire – and a threatened defamation suit – from
Socialist grandee Jack Lang. Perhaps the most awkward, though again unproblematic,
issue was Ségolène Royal’s presence as a Socialist leader closely linked to the presidential
candidate, but with no clear role as the outgoing presidential candidate. The promise of a
safe Socialist seat in La Rochelle had turned out to be an empty one by the legislative
elections, given the intransigence of the candidate ousted in her favour, but throughout the
presidential race, relative silence from a normally vocal politician simply reinforced the
sense of purpose behind Hollande’s campaign.
President of the people: Hollande’s electoral appeal
In the end, however auspicious the structure of competition and activist support for a
candidate, elections are won by the voters who turn out. Socially, Hollande’s first-round
vote is notable by the small lead he enjoyed across all social categories, with the
exception of the traditional bastions of right-wing voting: older voters, including the retired;
the self-employed; and, according to the Ipsos survey immediately after the first round
vote, professionals and senior managers, and voters educated to baccalaureate level
(Ipsos, ‘1er tour présidentielle. Comprendre le vote des Français’, 19-21 April 2012). This
pattern is emphasised in the run-off, but the professionals and senior managers and
baccalaureate group also move to a majority for Hollande (Table 2). 
Table 2: Sociological profile of presidential second round electorates (2007 and 2012)
Source: IPSOS, ‘2ème tour présidentielle 2007. Comprendre le vote des Français’, 6 May
2007; ‘2ème tour présidentielle 2012. Comprendre le vote des Français’, 3-5 May 2012.
 
 2007  2012 
 Nicolas 
Sarkozy 
Ségolène 
Royal 
 François 
Hollande 
Nicolas 
Sarkozy 
Male 
Female 
54 
52 
46 
48 
 52 
51 
48 
49 
18-24 year olds 
25-34 year olds 
35-44 year olds 
45-59 year olds 
60-69 year olds 
70 plus years old 
42 
57 
50 
45 
61 
68 
58 
43 
50 
55 
39 
32 
60 plus years old
57 
62 
53 
54 
41 
 
43 
38 
47 
46 
59 
Independent 
Professionals, senior 
managers 
Junior managers 
Routine non-manual 
Blue-collar 
82 
52 
 
49 
49 
46 
 
18 
48 
 
51 
51 
54 
30 
52 
 
60 
56 
58 
 
70 
48 
 
40 
44 
42 
 
No qualification 
Lower secondary 
Baccalaureate 
University / college 
51 
54 
53 
52 
49 
46 
47 
48 Bac. +2
Bac.+3
59 
49 
55 
50 
55 
41 
51 
45 
50 
45 
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In one sense, a traditional left-right split remains in social terms. But this is not
polarised. Rather than a divisive victory, the Socialist candidate was successful even in the
first round in mobilising a cross-section of the French population in greater numbers than
Sarkozy. As Table 2 shows, even the quintessential right social groups of independents
and older voters were present proportionately in much greater numbers for Hollande than
they had been for Royal five years previously. Similarly, all levels of organisational
employee supported this year’s Socialist candidate. Of course, the comparison is in one
sense invidious for Royal, as she was the losing candidate, and so by definition would
have enjoyed lower support. However, it does put into relief Hollande’s victory through
mobilising a cross-section of the electorate rather than entrenching successfully in the
left’s social milieu.
A majority of virtually all social groups clearly implies electoral victory for a candidate,
but equally it explains nothing in terms of the basis for that victory. In a system which since
2002 has been characterised as increasingly two-party (Grunberg, 2007), a structure which
systematically, as we have seen above, has continued in 2012, another basis for division
between the electorates of Hollande and Sarkozy, of left and right, needs to be found.
It is tempting to focus upon Nicolas Sarkozy’s unpopularity as a significant motivation
for Hollande’s victory. Commentators highlighted the apparently impossible task Sarkozy
faced in fighting his way back from popularity ratings which one month before the election
were at 36 per cent (Ifop, ‘Indice de popularité’, April 2012) and had been lower still a year
before. It was certain that a failure to deliver marked economic change, as promised in
2007, combined with an unfortunately ostentatious personal style as President, would incur
an electoral penalty of some magnitude. Yet the election result itself demonstrates that
popularity ratings, whilst informative of the general tenor of disposition towards an incum-
bent, are no guide to the actual vote. Sarkozy’s defeat was far from a landslide. Moreover,
in terms of both candidates attracting positive and negative votes – did their supporters
choose them to elect them, or to prevent the election of the other? – there was only one
point difference in those voting for Hollande to prevent Sarkozy being re-elected (48 per
cent) to those voting Sarkozy to prevent Hollande being elected (49 per cent) (Ifop, ‘Les
clés du second tours de l’élection présidentielle’, 6 May 2012). As much as Hollande was
elected because he wasn’t Sarkozy, so Sarkozy won support to impede Hollande.
In surveys directly after the second round in May, the same differences in motivation
between the respective voters of Hollande and Sarkozy emerged. Ipsos’s survey asked the
extent to which presidential stature, embodiment of change, and closeness to the French
people mattered – presidential status mattered to 81 per cent of Sarkozy’s voters, but only
17 per cent of Hollande’s; change to 8 per cent of Sarkozy’s voters, but 65 per cent of
Hollande’s. Only 9 per cent said they felt Sarkozy was close to the French, and voted for
him accordingly – but Hollande similarly only managed 29 per cent (Ipsos, ‘2ème tour
présidentielle 2012. Comprendre le vote des Français’, 3-5 May 2012). The mass-elite gap
which populist politicians have exploited and moderate politicians attempted to bridge is
still wide. The normality of Hollande as a man, and the self-avowed mundanity which he is
trying to bring to France’s presidency, may differentiate him from his predecessor, but is
not a sufficient condition for a successful term of office. 
The expectations of Hollande, and his success, stem from his offer of change in the
French system. There are multiple facets to this change: change in the presidential
persona; change in the relationship between institutions and society; change in France’s
overseas commitments and foreign policy; change in the economic fortunes of the country.
For many voters, the policy specifics and individual issue domains were of much lesser
import than a broader move to replace the status quo, summarised in Hollande’s campaign
slogan, ‘Le changement, c’est maintenant’ (‘Now things change’). Whatever the social
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profile of the voter, their decision to vote Hollande or not was taken in their belief that what
the Socialist candidate offered was qualitatively superior to what Sarkozy had provided
over the previous five years. Not good in absolute terms – simply better, relatively.
Conclusion
To assert that François Hollande won the 2012 presidential election because he
represented the candidate for change is in one sense trivial – any non-incumbent victor
may be characterised in such a fashion. The importance of ‘change’ to Hollande’s victory
lies in the challenge this represents from a mass public perspective not just to the
conservative right austerity of the previous UMP executive, but to the broader context of
the EU response to the economic crisis. The disappearance of the awkward yet viable
‘Merkozy’ axis at the heart of the European project marked the end to an inevitably thrifty
approach to rebooting EU economies. Hollande’s promise that there was an alternative to
public-sector downsizing and zealous belt-tightening found sufficient ears amongst the
French electorate to win him a term of office. It is of course too early to say whether it will
win him a second, but already there are signs that the optimism many French voters felt
about Hollande’s election is beginning to wane.
The French Central Bank’s prediction of a Q3 recession (-0.1 per cent) is unwelcome
news for the new President and his government, but hardly a surprise. To expect an imme-
diate turnaround either in GDP growth or unemployment in a small number of months
would have been economically unreasonable – but from an electoral perspective, reason is
only half the story. In recent opinion polls, Hollande’s June popularity ratings had dipped
slightly on average. Specifically amongst the two socio-economic groups most affected by
the economic crisis, namely blue-collar workers and the ‘squeezed middle’ of professions
intermédaires (though not white-collar employees, interestingly), greater drops of 8-9
points had occurred (Ifop, ‘Les indices du popularité’, 19-20 July 2012). 100 days into his
mandate, his satisfaction ratings were down to 46 per cent. Whatever the lag in effecting
economic recovery, some voters are already restless. Nevertheless, 57 per cent believe he
has delivered on his campaign pledges, and amongst his own first round voters, this rises
to 92 per cent (Ifop, ‘Le bilan des 100 jours de François Hollande’, 8 August 2012).
It is still hard to escape the conclusion that François Hollande and Prime Minister
Jean-Marc Ayrault’s popularity will drop further. Law-and-order issues, which beset
Sarkozy’s presidency, have not gone away, as the recent riots in Amiens have shown.
Europe’s future remains uncertain. Best-case scenarios for the French economy still
include some recession and subsequent flat growth. Moreover, the ability of the French
state to sustain measures such as the stimulus package for French car manufacturers, in
the wake of PSA’s announcement of 8,000 job losses and the closure of the Aulnay-sous-
Bois plant, depends heavily upon increased competiveness and demand beyond French
borders. Such a strategy was tried – largely unsuccessfully – by Hollande’s Socialist presi-
dential predecessor in the early 1980s.
But perhaps the period prior to Mitterrand’s Socialist experiment is as instructive for
the current administration. In 1978, an apparently leftist France still returned a right-wing
majority in the parliamentary elections. In a seminal study seeking to explain this paradox,
the key variable which emerged was le patrimoine – an individual’s portfolio of assets,
separate from income level (Capdevielle et al., 1981). Those with higher levels of assets
were more likely to support a right-wing party or presidential candidate. Recent work has
confirmed that amongst holders of ‘riskier’ assets, such as shares, business interests or
rental properties (Lewis-Beck et al., 2012, 54), such an effect is still at work almost 35
years later. With a programme to reduce France’s deficit including higher capital gains
RENEWAL Vol 20 No. 2/3
128
Renewal 20.2-3  12/09/2012  08:04  Page 128
Notebook normalising the French presidency
taxation, and a tax on inheritance and other assets, failure by Hollande to realise such a
reduction will rapidly eat into the gains made amongst voters with such holdings. The
majority of these may have voted right anyway – but a significant proportion moved to
Hollande in the hope of realising change from the economic disappointment and socially
illiberal doctrine of Sarkozy and the UMP. The capacity to satisfy such switchers, as well as
the core support, may well determine how long this swing of the pendulum lasts.
Jocelyn Evans is Professor of Politics at Salford University. He is the author of Voters and
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He is currently writing a book on the 2012 French elections with Gilles Ivaldi and James
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